Software watermarking involves embedding a unique identifier or, equivalently, a watermark value, within a software to discourage software theft; towards the embedding process, several graph theoretic watermarking algorithmic techniques encode the watermark values as graph structures and embed them in application programs. Recently, we presented an efficient codec system for encoding a watermark number w as a reducible permutation graph F[π * ] through the use of self-inverting permutations π * . In this paper, we propose a dynamic watermarking model for embedding the watermark graph F[π * ] into an application program P. The main idea behind the proposed watermarking model is a systematic use of appropriate calls of specific functions of the program P. More precisely, our model uses the dynamic call-graph G(P, I key ) of the program P, taken by the specific input I key , and the graph F[π * ], and produces the watermarked program P * having the following key property: its dynamic call-graph G(P * , I key ) and the reducible permutation graph F[π * ] are isomorphic graphs. Within this idea the program P * is produced by only altering appropriate real-calls of specific functions of the input program P. Moreover, the proposed watermarking model incorporates such properties which cause it resilient to attacks.
INTRODUCTION
The rapid growth of World Wide Web users, the ease of distributing fast and in the original form digital content through internet, as well as the lack of technical measures to assure the intellectual property right of owners, has led to an incensement in copyright infringement. Digital watermarking is a technique for protecting the intellectual property of any digital content. The idea of digital watermarking is the embedding of a unique identifier into the digital image, audio, or video data, software and text through the introduction of errors not detectable by human perception (Cox et al., 1996) .
According to the recent Business Software Alliance (BSA) global software piracy study (BSA, 2011) over half of the worlds personal computer users -57 percent -admit they pirate software. What is more, as the price of hardware drops and the price of licensed software goes up, piracy becomes more popular and lucrative. This fact has led to a more systematic work on protecting the intellectual property as can be seen from a recent research of World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) where there is a growth of intellectual property filings (WIPO, 2012) .
Software Watermarking. Although digital watermarking has made considerable progress and become a popular technique for copyright protection of multimedia information (Cox et al., 1996) , research on software watermarking has recently received sufficient attention. The patent by Davidson and Myhrvold (Davidson and Myhrvold, 1996) presented the first published software watermarking algorithm, where and other patents have been published lately (Rodriguez et al., 2010; Collberg et al., 2011; Horne et al., 2012) . The major software watermarking algorithms currently available are based on several techniques, among which the register allocation (Qu and Potkonjak, 1998) , spread-spectrum (Zhang et al., 2011) , opaque predicate (Arboit, 2002) , abstract interpretation (Cousot and Cousot, 2004) , dynamic path techniques , code re-orderings (Sharma et al., 2011) .
The software watermarking problem can be described as the problem of embedding a structure w into a program P and, thus, producing a new program P w , such that w can be reliably located and extracted from P w even after P w has been subjected to code transformations such as translation, optimization and obfuscation (Myles and Collberg, 2006) . More precisely, given a program P, a watermark w, and a key k, the software watermarking problem can be formally described by the following two functions: embed(P, w, k) → P w and extract(P w , k) → w.
There are two main categories of watermarking algorithms namely static and dynamic algorithms (Collberg and Thomborson, 1999) . A static watermark is stored inside program code in a certain format, and it does not change during the program execution. A dynamic watermark is built during program execution, perhaps only after a particular sequence of input. It might be retrieved by analyzing the data structures built when watermarked program is running. In other cases, tracing the program execution may be required.Further discussion of static and/or dynamic watermarking issues can be found in (Davidson and Myhrvold, 1996; Venkatesan et al., 2001) .
Graph-based Codecs and Attacks.
Recently, several software watermarking algorithms have been appeared in the literature that encode watermarks as graph structures. In general, such encodings make use of an encoding function encode which converts a watermarking number w into a graph G, encode(w) → G, and also of a decoding function decode that converts the graph G into the number w, decode(G) → w; we usually call the pair (encode, decode) G as graph codec system (Collberg et al., 2003) . From a graph-theoretic point of view, we are looking for a class of graphs G and a corresponding codec (encode, decode) G with the following properties which cause them resilience to attacks:
• Appropriate graph types: Graphs in G should be directed having such properties, i.e., nodes with small outdegree, so that matching real program graphs;
• High resiliency: The function decode(G) should be insensitive to small changes of G; that is, if
• Small size: The size |P w | − |P| of the embedded watermark should be small;
• Efficient codecs: The functions encode and decode should be computed in polynomial time.
Related Work. In 1996, Davidson and Myhrvold (Davidson and Myhrvold, 1996) proposed the first software watermarking algorithm which is static and embeds the watermark by reordering the basic blocks of a control flow-graph; note that a static watermark is stored inside programs' code in a certain format and it does not change during the programs' execution.
Based on this idea, Venkatesan, Vazirani and Sinha (Venkatesan et al., 2001) proposed the first graphbased software watermarking algorithm which embeds the watermark by extending a method's control flow-graph through the insertion of a directed subgraph; it is also a static algorithm called VVS or GTW. Collberg et al. (Collberg et al., 2009) proposed an implementation of GTW, which they call GTW sm , and it is the first publicly available implementation of the algorithm GTW. Note that, for encoding integers the GTW sm method uses only those permutations that are self-inverting. The first dynamic watermarking algorithm (CT) was proposed by Collberg and Thomborson (Collberg and Thomborson, 1999) ; it embeds the watermark through a graph structure which is built on a heap at runtime. Recently, the authors of this paper (Chroni and Nikolopoulos, 2010; Chroni and Nikolopoulos, 2011) extended the class of software watermarking algorithms and graph structures by proposing an efficient and easily implemented codec system for encoding watermark numbers as reducible permutation flowgraphs; see also (Chroni and Nikolopoulos, 2012) .
Our Contribution. Recently, we presented an efficient method for encoding integers as self-inverting permutations (or, for short, SiP) and algorithms for encoding a self-inverting permutation π * into a reducible permutation flow-graph F[π * ] (or, for short, RPG) (Chroni and Nikolopoulos, 2010; Chroni and Nikolopoulos, 2011) ; the graph F[π * ] incorporates properties capable to match real program graphs, that is, it does not differ from the graph data structures built by real programs since its maximum outdegree does not exceed two and it has a unique root node so the program can reach other nodes from the root node.
In this paper, we propose a dynamic watermarking model for embedding the watermark graph F[π * ] into an application program P. The main idea behind the proposed watermarking model is a systematic use of appropriate calls of specific functions of the program P. More precisely, our model uses the dynamic call-graph G(P, I key ) of the program P, taken by the specific input I key , and the graph F[π * ], and produces the watermarked program P * having the following key property: its dynamic call-graph G(P * , I key ) and the reducible permutation graph F[π * ] are isomorphic graphs. Within this idea the program P * is produced by only altering appropriate real-calls of specific functions of the input program P. Moreover, the proposed watermarking model incorporates such properties which cause it resilient to attacks.
BACKGROUND RESULTS
In this section, we present basic components and background results that are used in the design of our watermarking model. We also briefly discuss properties of dynamic call-graphs which are used as keyobjects in our watermarking model for embedding the graph F[π * ] into an application program.
Encode Numbers as RPGs
We consider finite graphs with no multiple edges. For a graph G, we denote by V (G) and E(G) the vertex set and edge set of G, respectively. We also consider permutations over the set N n = {1, 2, . . . , n}.
A. Self-inverting Permutation (SiP). Let π be a permutation over the set N n . We think of permutation π as a sequence (π 1 , π 2 , . . . , π n ), so, for example, the permutation π = (1, 4, 2, 7, 5, 3, 6) has π 1 = 1, π 2 = 4, etc. Notice that π −1 i is the position in the sequence of the number i.
Definition 2.1. Let π = (π 1 , π 2 , . . . , π n ) be a permutation over the set N n . The inverse of π is the permu-
Notation 2.1. Throughout the paper we denote a self-inverting permutation π over the set N n as π * .
B. Reducible Permutation Graphs (RPG).
A flow-graph is a directed graph F with an initial node s from which all other nodes are reachable. A directed graph G is strongly connected when there is a path x → y for all nodes x, y in V (G). A node u is an entry for a subgraph H of the graph G when there is a path p = (y 1 , y 2 , . . . , y k , x) such that p ∩ H = {x}. Definition 2.2. A flow-graph is reducible when it does not have a strongly connected subgraph with two (or more) entries.
There are at least three other equivalent definitions, as Theorem 2.1 shows. Those definitions use a few more graph-theoretic concepts.
Theorem 2.1. (Hecht and Ullman, 1972; Hecht and Ullman, 1974) : Let F be a flow-graph. The following three statements are equivalent:
(1) the graph F is reducible;
(2) the graph F has a unique DFS dag; (3) the graph F can be transformed into a single node by repeated application of the transformations T 1 and T 2 , where T 1 removes a cycle-edge, and T 2 picks a non-initial node y that has only one incoming edge and glue nodes x and y.
The reducible permutation graph F[π * ] is directed with descending ordering on its nodes V (G) = {s = u n+1 , u n , . . . , u 1 , u 0 = t}. Throughout the paper, we shall call the edge
C. Codec Algorithms. In (Chroni and Nikolopoulos, 2010) we introduced the notion of bitonic permutations and we presented two algorithms, namely Encode W.to.SiP and Decode SiP.to.W, for encoding an integer w into an self-inverting permutation π * and extracting it from π * ; see also (authors paper, 2011) (Chroni and Nikolopoulos, 2011 Recently, we have presented an efficient and easily implemented algorithm for encoding numbers as reducible permutation flow-graphs through the use of self-inverting permutations (Chroni and Nikolopoulos, 2012 ).
In particular, we have proposed the algorithm Encode SiP.to.RPG, which encodes the selfinverting permutation π * as a reducible permutation flow-graph F[π * ] by exploiting domination relations on the elements of π * and using an efficient DAG representation of π * . We also proposed the decoding algorithm Decode RPG.to.SIP, which extract the self-inverting permutation
The whole encoding process takes O(n) time and requires O(n) space, where n is the length of the permutation π * . The decoding process takes time and space linear in the size of the flow-graph F[π * ], that is, the algorithm Decode RPG.to.SIP takes O(n) time and space. Our results presented in (authors' paper, 2012) are summarized in the following theorems. 
Dynamic Call-graphs
A call-graph is a directed graph that represents calling relationships between program units in a computer program. Specifically, the nodes of a call-graph represent functions, procedures, classes, or similar program units and each edge ( f i , f j ) indicates that function f i calls function f j ; function f i is called caller and function f j is called callee.
Call-graphs can be divided in two main classes of graphs, namely static and dynamic.
A static call-graph is the structure describing those invocations that could be made from one program unit to another in any possible execution of the program (Xie and Notkin, 2002) . The static call-graph can be determined from the program source code; we mention that, its construction is a time consuming process specifically in the case of large scale softwares.
A dynamic call-graph G is a directed graph that includes invocations of caller-callee pairs, over an execution of the program P. A dynamic call-graph can be considered as an instance of the corresponding static call-graph for a specific input sequence I. The call-graph G is the key data structure that dynamic optimizers use to analyze and optimize the wholeprogram's behavior. Such a graph can be extracted by a profiler. It is fair to mention that the construction of a dynamic call-graph G of a program P is not a time consuming process even if P is a large scale software.
Throughout the paper we denote a call-graph G of the program P over the input I as G(P, I). Figures 2(a) depicts the structure of the dynamic callgraph G(P, I key ) of an application program P with input I key .
THE DYNAMIC WATERMARKING MODEL
Having encoded a watermark number w as reducible permutation graph F[π * ], let us now propose a dynamic watermarking model based on which we can efficiently watermark an application program P by embedding the graph F[π * ] into P producing thus the watermarked program P * .
The main idea behind the proposed dynamic watermarking model is the use of the dynamic callgraph G(P, I key ) of the program P, taken by the specific input I key , and the graph F[π * ] in order to produce the watermarked program P * having the following key property: its dynamic call-graph G(P * , I key ) and the reducible permutation graph F[π * ] are isomorphic graphs. Within this idea the program P * is produced by only altering appropriate real-calls of specific functions of the input program P. Figure 2 shows the dynamic call-graph G(P, I key ) of an application program P, the reducible permutation graph F[π * ] which encodes the number w = 4 and the dynamic call-graph G(P * , I key ) of the watermarked program P * .
Next, we first describe the data and operational components used by the model and, then, we present the embedding/extracting watermarking algorithms.
Model Components
Our watermarking model uses two main categories of components namely data components and operational components. The first category includes the dynamic call-graph G(P, I key ) of the input program P, the watermark graph F[π * ], and the dynamic call-graph G(P * , I key ) of the watermarked program P * , while the second category includes call patterns and control statements which are components related to the process of embedding the graph F[π * ] into application program P. We next describe the construction and main properties of the dynamic call-graph G(P * , I key ), two call patterns based on which we correspond edges of the call-graph G(P * , I key ) to function calls, and specific variables and statements which control the execution of real and water functions.
(I) The Dynamic Call-graph G(P * , I key ). Let F[π * ] be a watermark-graph on n + 2 nodes and G(P, I key ) be the dynamic call-graph of a program P on n + 3 nodes f main , f s , f 1 , . . . , f n , f t taken after running the program P with the input I key . In general, the selection of the input I key is such that it produces the callgraph G(P, I key ) having structure as "close" as possible to the structure of F[π * ]. We assign the n + 2 nodes f s = f n+1 , f n , . . . , f 1 , f 0 = f t of the call-graph G(P, I key ) to n + 2 nodes s = u n+1 , u n , . . . , u 1 , u 0 = t of F[π * ] into 1-1 correspondence; the main function f main do not correspond to any node of F[π * ]. Let (u i , u j ) be an edge in graph F[π * ] and let ( f i , f j ) be an edge in call-graph G(P, I key ). We say that the edge ( f i , f j ) corresponds to edge (u i , u j ) iff the node f i corresponds to u i and the node f j corre- a forward (resp. backward) edge in the graph F[π * ] we say that the corresponding edge ( f i , f j ) in graph G(P, I key ) is a forward (resp. backward) edge.
The dynamic call-graph G(P * , I key ) is constructed as follows:
• V (G(P * , I key )) = V (G(P, I key )), i.e., it has the same nodes as the call-graph G(P, I key );
The edges of the call-graph G(P * , I key ) are divided into two categories namely real and water edges; note that, the real (resp. water) edges are corresponded to real (resp. water) function calls. An edge ( f i , f j ) of the call-graph G(P, I key ) is characterized as either
is not an edge in G(P, I key ). Figure 2 shows the dynamic call-graph G(P * , I key ) along with its real edges (solid arrows) and water edges (dashed arrows); it also depicts the dynamic call-graph G(P, I key ) and the watermark-graph F[π * ].
(II) Call Patterns. In the implementation phase, we modify the source code of program P using specific function call patterns which we describe below.
Let P be an application program, G(P, I key ) be the dynamic call-graph of the program P with input I key , and F[π * ] be a watermark-graph which we have to embed into P. According to our watermarking model, the embedding process relies mainly on altering the execution-flow of appropriate function calls of P such that the execution of the resulting program P * with the input I key produces a call-graph G(P * , I key ) which, after removing the node f main , is isomorphic to watermark-graph F[π * ].
Let ( f i , f j ) be an edge of call-graph G(P * , I key ) or, equivalently, an edge which we want to appear in G(P * , I key ). Since G(P * , I key ) has two types of edges it follows that ( f i , f j ) is either real or water edge. Based on the type of ( f i , f j ), we do the following:
• if ( f i , f j ) is a water edge we add the statement call(f j ) in the function f i , while
is a real edge we add no call statement since the statement call( f j ) exists in f i . Based on whether ( f i , f j ) is either a forward or a backward edge we add specific statements in functions f i and f j according to the following two call patterns namely forward and backward call patterns: Recall that the direct edge ( f i , f j ) of a call-graph represents a function call operation where f i is the caller function and f j the callee function; in other words, it means that in function f i there exists the statement call( f j ). Hereafter, in this case we shall say that ( f i , f j ) is a direct call.
In a call-graph of an application program we usually meet sequences of calls of the form
. For simplicity we set f i = f k 0 and f j = f k m+1 and suppose that each of these calls
is either forward or backward. We extend the notion of the direct call ( f i , f j ) to indirect call ( f i → f j ); an indirect call consists of a path of functions ( f i , f k 1 , . . . , f j ) of length ℓ ≥ 2. Using the f-call and b-call patterns, we next define the path call pattern or, for short, p-call as follows: Note that an indirect call ( f i → f j ) consisting of a path of functions ( f i , f k 1 , . . . , f j ) of length ℓ can be considered as a sequence of ℓ direct calls.
(III) Control Statements. In any watermarking model both the original program P and the watermarked program P * have to operate identically, that is, the output O(P, I) of the program P must be the same with the output O(P * , I) of the program P * for every input I. Thus, since the call-graphs G(P, I key ) and G(P * , I key ) dictate the execution flow of the original program P and the watermarked program P * , respectively, and since the call-graph G(P, I key ) is not isomorphic to G(P * , I key ) we have to control the flow of selected function calls of P * so that O(P, I) = O(P * , I) for every input I.
To do this, we exploit the values of specific variables in a function f i by using them in some selected or added control statements as part of opaque predicates. More precisely, in our watermarking model we use the values of the variable x of the f-call and b-call patterns and include it in a specific control statement s causing thus an "appropriate execution flow" of the functions of the call-graph G(P * , I key ); with the term "appropriate execution flow" we mean that the execution flow of the functions of the call-graph G(P * , I key ) is such that O(P, I) = O(P * , I) for every input I. Hereafter, we shall call cf-statement the control statement s since it controls the execution flow of the functions of G(P * , I key ) and, in an analogous way, we shall call cf-variable the variable x of the f-call and b-call patterns.
We next describe the mechanism which ensures an appropriate execution flow of the functions of G(P * , I key ) through the altering of the execution flow of the functions of the program P by modifying or adding some specific control statements. In fact, what the mechanism actually does is to modify the conditions or expressions of these control statements by adding opaque predicates. Definition 3.1. A predicate Q is opaque at a program point p, if at point p the outcome of Q is known at embedding time. If Q always evaluates to true we write Q T p , for false we write Q F p , and if Q sometimes evaluates to true and sometimes to false we write Q ? p . Let ( f i , f j ) be a direct call in our program P * or, equivalently, an edge in the call-graph G(P * , I key ); it is either real, water, forward, or backward edge. In any case, the proposed mechanism uses the value of the variable x of the f-call or b-call pattern of ( f i , f j ) and does the following:
• In function f i : create a control statement (if, switch, for, while, etc) , add an opaque predicate Q ? p with respect to cf-variable x in the condition of the control statement, and insert it at a point p before the statement x = x + h() or x = x + g(); we can also select an existing control statement at a point p, consider it as cf-statement, and include in its condition part the opaque predicate Q ? p .
• In function f j : create a control statement (if, switch, for, while, etc), add an opaque predicate Q ? p with respect to cf-variable x in the condition of the control statement, and insert it at a point p before the statement x = x + c(); the main body of f j is included in a block of a cf-statement the execution of which is depending upon the truthness or falsity of the opaque predicate Q ?
is an edge in the call-graph G(P * , I key ), we do not create a new control statement but we use the pre- 
... ... statements; ... Table 3 : An example of cf-statement modification via opaque predicates of the function f j in the case where ( f i , f j ) is a water and forward function call. Table 1 shows an example of the modification of the condition part of an if cf-statement via an opaque predicate; since ( f i , f j ) is a water and forward function call, the statement call( f j ) does not exist in function f i , and thus we add it in f i , while the cfstatement is the x = x + h(). On the other hand, Table 2 shows an example in this case where ( f i , f j ) is a real and backward function call. In this case, the statement call( f j ) does exist in f i while the cfstatement is the x = x + g(). Table 3 shows an example of the modification of the function f j in the case where ( f i , f j ) is a water and forward function call.
Remark 3.1. Based on the structural properties of the watermark graph F[π * ] and call-graph G(P * , I key ) we can easily prove the following lemma.
Lemma 3.1. Let G(P, I key ) and G(P * , I key ) be the call-graphs of programs P and P * , respectively, on input I key , and let ( f i , f j ) be an edge in callgraph G(P, I key ). Then, there always exists an edge
Remark 3.2. In our implementation, in the case where
is not an edge in G(P * , I key ) we have to compute a path
Such a path is a shortest path from f i to f j in the graph G(P * , I key ); it may consist of all types of edges, that is, real or water edges and forward or backward edges. Figure 4 (a) shows the edge ( f 4 , f 6 ) in G(P, I key ) which is not an edge in G(P * , I key ), while Figure 4 (b) shows its corresponding shortest path from f i to f j , that is, the path ( f 4 , f 3 , f 5 , f 6 ); note that, ( f 4 , f 3 ) is a real and forward edge, ( f 3 , f 5 ) is a real and backward edge, and ( f 5 , f 6 ) is a water and backward edge.
(VI) Execution Rules. We present the rules based on which we control the execution flow of the functions of P * such that O(P, I) = O(P * , I) for every input I. In fact, we show in all the cases how the value of Q ? p dictates the execution flow of functions of G(P * , I key ).
Let ( f i , f j ) be a direct call in our program P * or, equivalently, an edge in the call-graph G(P * , I key ). We distinguish the following cases:
Assesment Criteria Figure 5 : The Assessment tree (ASC) with its two subtrees namely the Performance subtree (P) and the Resilience subtree (R).
Assessments Criteria
We propose a set of such evaluation criteria presented in a tree structure which we call Assessment Tree or, for short, A-tree (see, Figure 5 ); it consists of two main subtrees namely:
• Performance subtree, and
• Resilience subtree.
The Performance subtree (or, P-tree) contains criteria concerning the performance of the resulting program after embedding of the watermark w, that is, the watermarked program P * , while the Resilience subtree (or, R-tree) contains criteria concerning the resilience of the embedded watermark w; hereafter, we shall equivalently use the terms P-criteria and R-criteria for the criteria of the P-tree and R-tree, respectively.
Performance
The performance criteria mainly focus on the overhead and the protection of software; in our classification the P-criteria are the following:
• Data Rate. The ratio of the number of bits of source code (P) to the number of bits of watermark (w) that can be embedded into P.
• Embedding Overhead. The additional time and space caused by implementing a watermarking model during the execution.
• Part Protection. The watermarking models should spread the message throughout the entire code of software, in order to decrease the probability that all or part of the message is destroyed during attacks or in a possible partial interception.
• Credibility. The detector should minimize the probability to generate false positives and false negative results.
Let us now discuss on the performance of the waterRpg model and let us first focus on the data rate and the embedding overhead of our model. Both criteria essentially depends on the value of the watermark w or, equivalently, of the size of the embedding graph
In the case where the code (in bits) of the original program P is huge our model has high data rate and extremely low embedding overhead. This arises from the fact that P * does not contain any dummy code since we only modify the existing control flow graph of P preserving thus the functionality of the resulting watermarked program P * by replacing a function call with a pair of function calls with the help of control statements. Moreover, the more the watermark value w, that is about to be encoded to a reducible permutation graph F[π * ], is acceding, the better the part protection is. The reason for that lies on the fact that the number of the code's functions used is greater leading to a 'spread' of the watermark in a large-scaled code. Of course, this also contributes to an inevitable trade-off between the first two criteria i.e. the data rate and the embedding overhead.
The credibility of a watermarking model is dependent on how detectable the watermark is, in order to prove ownership. Concerning our model, we should point out that the rates of false positive and false negative outcomes are noticeably low because even in cases where the watermarked code undergoes attacks, the sequence according to which the call functions are being executed is very hardly distorted.
Resilience
The resilience criteria mainly focus on the stealthiness and the distortion of the watermark; in our classification the R-tree contains two main categories of assessment criteria:
• Watermark Attacks. In this case the attacker has detected (or, recognized) the watermark embedded in P, this is, the code of program P associated with the watermark w, and thus makes specific operations mainly on that code in order to
• remove (e.g., by subtracting parts or all of the watermark), • destroy (e.g., by applying semantics preserving transformation), or even • alter the watermark w.
In order to alter the watermark the attacker either adds a new w ′ or modifies the existing w.
• Code Attacks. In the case where the attacker fails to detect the code of program P associated with the watermark w, he makes attacks in the whole code aiming in this way to distort possible watermarking protections; in this category, our classification includes • obfuscation (e.g., reducible to non-reducible flow graphs of methods), • optimization (e.g., remove information for debugging with tool named ProGuard), • de-compilation (e.g., using the Java Decompiler tool), and • language-transformation attacks (e.g., convert a program from C++ to Java). The watermark attacks take place when the code of program P * associated with the embedded watermark w is known to the attacker. In such a case, if the attacker makes a modification in a value of a cf-variable in a call-site p, then he has to properly modify all the values of all the cf-variables in every call-site of the execution flow after p and, thus, the watermark w remains unchained.
As described in the previous sections in our model we use appropriate function calls of the application program P and modify the execution flow of P through the use of control statements cf-statements and cf-variables such that O(P, I) = O(P * , I) for every input I. In fact what we do is creating dependencies on the data between the original program P and the watermark w making thus the watermark graph part of the computation of the program P. This leads to the failure of a dead code elimination process, because the removal of any of the cf-variables would make the program P non operational. What is more, every cf-statement produces different results, so our model withstands common subexpression elimination.
Our model uses opaque predicates in specific control statements in order to control the flow of selected function calls of P * so that the watermarked program P * have an appropriate execution. It is worth noting that it is hard for an attacker to deduce an opaque predicate at run time. Specifically, the usage of opaque predicates in our model enables us to dictate the execution flow of function calls and also makes the programs' control flow difficult for an attacker to analyze it either statically or dynamically.
Moreover, it is worth noting that if the attacker modifies a real-call then the program P * is no longer operating. On the other hand, if the attacker modifies a water-call call( f i ), that is, modifies a water edge ( f i , f j ), then this modification can be detected by our model WaterRpg due to error-correcting properties of the reducible permutation graph F[π * ] which represents the watermark w.
The code attacks are broadly applied in the whole code of the watermarked program P * . Our watermarking model WaterRpg watermarks an application program P in such a way that it withstands on a relatively large subset of obfuscation and optimization attacks including semantic-preserving transformations, shrinking, re-ordering, and also the time consuming operation namely language transformation (i.e., the attacker rewrites the whole code of P * in another language).
More precisely, the watermark can be efficiently extracted even the code of P * has been subjected to some control obfuscation attacks such as expression reordering or loop reordering. It is fair to mention that our model does not properly operate on some other control obfuscation attacks such as aggregation including inline functions, outline functions, etc.
As far as the optimization attacks are concerned we point out that the embedded watermark w of our model withstands on such attacks since any removal of system calls, dead code, or information for debugging does not affect the structural properties of the embedding graph F[π * ] which represents the watermark w.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this paper we presented a dynamic watermarking model for embedding a reducible permutation graph F[π * ] into an application program P using appropriate calls of specific functions of P.
The main feature of our model is its ability to embed the graph F[π * ] into P using only real functions and thus the size of the watermarked program P * remains relatively very small. Moreover, the proposed dynamic watermarking model has low time complexity and incorporates such properties which cause it resilient to attacks.
An important property of our model is its ability to not use any mark during the embedding process in order to be able to extract the embedding watermark from the software.
Finally, we point out that it would be very interesting to evaluate our dynamic watermarking model in order to gain information on its practical behavior; we leave it as a problem for future work.
